Ch. 4 Substance and Accident According to the People of Allah

If you deepen your gaze at the realities of things you will find that some are antecedent, surrounded by accidents, and some are subsequent and attached. The antecedents are substances and the subsequent are accidents and both are joined together by existence since it is manifests itself in the form of each.

[All] substances are united with Substantial, as such, which is a single reality, and it is the manifestation of the divine Essence, from the perspective of its universally sustaining nature and reality, in the same way that accidents are manifestations of the names that are subordinate to the Essence. Do you not see that the divine Essence remains veiled by the names? Likewise, substances remained enveloped in accidents. Just as the Essence adds an attribute, or a name, whether universal or particular, similarly, Substance, as such, through the addition of a universal meaning becomes a specific substance and a manifestation of a specific name from among the Universal Names; rather it is identical with it. Through the addition of a specific meaning becomes a partial substance such as an individual.

Just as the combining of universal names engenders other names, the combining of simple substances engenders other substances composed of them. Just as some names encompass other names, some substances encompass others. Just as the Mothers of the Names are finite, the genera of substances and their types are finite. Just as the branches of the names are infinite, the entities are likewise infinite.

This reality [Substance] in the terminology of the people of Allah, is called the Breath of the All-Merciful (al-nafas al-rahmani), and the Universal Primordial Substance (hayula al-kulliya), and that which becomes entitled and enters existence is called the divine words (al-kalimaat al-ilahiya).

If this reality is viewed with respect to its genus, which is related to the types subsumed under it, then it is called the natural genus (tabi’a jinsiya). If it is viewed with respect to species, through which a type becomes a type, it is called the natural differentium (tabi’a fasliya), since it is a part of it, in addition to a specific attribute carried over to the type, insofar as it is what it is, and not something else. If it is viewed with respect to its shares occurring equally in its individuals, or within a type, uniformly, it is called the natural type (tabi'a naw'iya). The genus, differentium and type are secondary intelligibles related to them.

The essence of Substance is identical with simple and compound substances, for it is the reality of realities descended from the Unseen world of the Essence to the visible sensible world, and manifests in each realm to the extent of what it appropriate for that world.

Its union with universal or particular meanings is none other than its manifestation in it and self-disclosure through it, sometimes in its universal degrees and sometimes in its particular degrees. [Substance] is a singular essence with respect to itself, but multiple with respect to its manifestations in its attributes, which with respect to their realities are concomitant with that essence, although with respect to their manifestation they depend on equilibrium, which it possesses in actuality.

Whatever is in individualization in actuality or in potential, at a given time or permanently, from among the concomitants and attributes, is present in them in unseen form. Since everything that becomes manifest, before its manifestation, exists within it in potentiality otherwise it could not be manifested.

Substance has neither genus, nor differentium, nor definition, since that which is mentioned by way of definition is a description, and not a true definition.

Since there are divine self-disclosures manifesting numerous attributes according to the verse, "Everyday He is upon some task," (al-Rahman: 29) the accidents become multiple and infinite, even though the Maternal names among them are finite. This point alerts you to the fact that the attributes with respect to their entification in the presence of the names, have realities distinct from one another, although they return to a single reality shared between them from another perspective, just as their loci of manifestation are distinct realities from one another, despite sharing accidentality. This is because everything in existence is evidence and a sign for that which is in the Unseen.

Remark using the language of the Speculative Thinkers:  

Know that the contingent entities are limited to being substances and accidents. Substance, as such, is identical with substances in the external world, and distinction among them is through the accidentals attached to each. This is because all substances share their nature as substances and are distinguished from one another by that which is not shared. These distinguishing qualities are outside of their nature as substances are consequently accidents.

It cannot be said, why is it not permissible for Substance, as such, to be a general accident for substances? This is because the general accident only differentiates its individual loci in the intellect and not in the external world, whereas in the external world, it is identical with its individual. Otherwise, the general accident cannot be imposed on them as it truly is, and this is the desired conclusion. Furthermore, if their nature as substances were a general accident outside of the substances in the external world, substantial realities would not be substances in and of themselves, insofar as they are the loci of accidentals; since by definition, accidentals cannot be the loci of attachment.  

Furthermore, if this nature were to exist by means of an existence other than that of its separate instances, it would resemble accidents, which would not allow congruent (muwatat) predication of its instances, and the non-existence of the nature as substance would not necessitate the non-existence of its individual instance because of its being external to it. However, the non-existence of a manifest accompanying attribute does not necessitate the non-existence of its locus, rather, it is only an indication of it, as mentioned in the first chapter.

If the nature as substance did not exist as such, the individual instances of substances would be different from it in the external world, because of the non-existence of the nature of substance itself; this is impossible. If, however, the individual instance exists through the same existence as the substances, it is identical with it in the external world, and this is the desired conclusion. In addition, if the substance is not identical to the particularities to which it could be correctly attributed in the external world, it would be either included in it entirely, resulting in the compounding of quiddities of substance, ad infinitum, if the differentium were a substance. This is because substance partakes in the differentium, and its inclusion in it necessitates that no substance is simple. Or, it is a compound quiddity composed of substance and accident whereby the differentium is an accident. In this case, the Substantial quiddity would partake of accidentality. Or, it is included in some to the exclusion of others, necessitating that certain of its loci in and of itself—irrespective of its accidentals—is not a substance. Or, it is completely outside of being a substance, resulting in a greater impossibility than the previous case, which was mentioned earlier. So it is identical to its individuals in the external world and the distinction between them is through specific accidents, for it is not permissible that the distinguisher be itself or one of its individuals.

It cannot be said that if entities of substances differed only with respect to their accidentals, they would not differ in their essences as well, but would be shared in the way that individual humans share a single reality [humanness]. We respond that all substances share the reality of substantiality, just as the individuals of a type (naw'a) share the reality of the type. The distinction between their essences follows their acquiring their essences since a type does not become a type except by universal accidentals attached to the reality of the substance, just as an individual does not become an individual except by particular accidentals attached to the reality of the type.

Do you not see that when speech is associated with an animal it is called a human, and when neighing is associated with it, it is called a horse, and when braying is associated with it, it is called a donkey. Each quality is an accidental. Thus, if one wishes to predicate congruently, he must use a derivation, so as to say, "A human is a speaking animal," and a "horse is a neighing animal." Speech is predicated through its derivation since "speech" is predicated congruently.  That which possesses speech, meaning speaker, is identical with the animal which is in the existence of man, even if [animal] is more general than man. For this reason, [speech] is predicated of [animal] insofar as it is what it is; there is nothing other than animality and speech.

Therefore, it is known that the conceptual compound is only between the nature of animality and the nature of speech and nothing else. The former is shared and the latter is not. This does not necessitate in the composition of substance to be of substance and accident, because that which has speech is the substance and not the compound, such as an individual.

The difference between concepts of type and concepts of individual is that the former is the joining of a universal to a universal so that it does not remove it from its universality. The latter is the joining of a particular with a universal, which removes the latter from its universality.

The general accident is that which includes two or more realities, and the property (khassa) is that which is distinguished by single reality. The former is like walking or sensing and the latter is like speech or laughter. That which possesses ambulation is called "walker" through the general accident, and that which engages in laughter is called "laugher" through the property, according to the speculative thinkers. They are identical with animal and human in external existence and not something superadded and external to either of them, even though conceptually they are more general than both. Therefore, that which is a general accident in relation to types is a differentium generating type in relation to the genus under which these types are subsumed, and that which is a property is a differentium for the type.

Predicating speech for human by a congruent predication precludes one from saying, "Something that speaks is another quiddity which is predicated for human because their existence is united." This is because the predication of a quiddity for something that is distinct from it is impossible.

Unity of existence does not enter [predication], since predication is for quiddity not existence. Were this permissible, it would be permissible to predicate the parts of the quiddity as well—compounded from existing parts—for it when it exists as single existent, the existence of the compound.

It should not be imagined that the principle of speech, which is the rational soul, does pertain to the animal [itself], so that [speech] attaches to it and an animal becomes a human through it; even though it is not appropriate for being the differentium because it is an independent existent in the external world. Rather this principle is with everything, even the inanimate objects as well, since everything has a share in the realms of Dominion (malakut) and Invincibility (jabarut).

That which affirms this comes from the wellspring of prophethood, the who witnesses objects by their realities—peace be upon him—such as the speaking of animals and inanimate objects with him, and God says, "There is nothing except that it extols His praise, but you do not understand their glorification" (al-Isra: 33). The manifestation of speech for each is in accordance with the divine custom and norm, which depends on equilibrium in the human constitution. As for the perfected ones this is not the case because of their being aware of the hidden aspects of things and perceiving their speech.

What the later scholars said, "The meaning of “nutq” is perceiving universals and not speech," in contravention to common usage, does not assist them. This is because [their premise] is that the rational [soul] is only posited for humans, but they do not have proof for it nor do they have any awareness that the animals do not perceive universals; the ignorance of a thing does not negate its existence, and deepening one's gaze on what remarkable things they exhibit requires that they perceive universals. Furthermore, it is not possible to perceive the particular without its universal, since the particular is the universal with individuation. And Allah is the Guide.

Another Remark  

Just as the accident by its essence, seeks the locus in which it subsists, which is the substance, likewise the substance by its essence seeks the accident to manifest through it, rather it is the cause for the existence of the accident and its seeking it. This results in an inseparable relationship between them. Each of them is divided—by a type of division—into that which is substance and accident in the intellect and that which is substance and accident in the external world.

The former are the Immutable Archetypes of substance and accident which exist on the plane of divine knowledge, the genera and differentia predicated congruently for specific types. The latter are substances and accidents in the external world, for that reason substance is defined as a quiddity which does not inhere in something else, or an existent that does not have a locus, and accident is in the contrary. Combination of two substances or more of the first type does not negate the predication for its subject such as animal and speech, which are predicated of human.

Necessity, Contingency and Impossibility:  

Since the Shaykh—may God be pleased with him—has mentioned in his book necessity in itself and necessity by something else, contingency and the contingent, and impossibility, we have explained these three relations in the following way. We say: Necessity, contingency and impossibility, in that they are pure rational relations, have no realization in the entities in the way accidents are realized in their external loci. They do not have existence except in the minds because they are states that follow upon the unseen essences which are permanent on the plane of knowledge. They are viewed with respect to their existences in the external world, such as contingency for the contingent and impossibility for the impossible, or with respect to their being identical with that essence, such as necessity for Being qua Being. For, He is necessary by His Essence and His necessity is not because of external superadded existence.

Thus, necessity is the inevitable self-necessitation intrinsic to the essence and its realization in the external world. Impossibility is the inevitable self-necessitation of non­existence in the external world. Contingency is the absence of self-necessitation of either existence or non-existence. Both contingency and impossibility are privative attributes in that they predicate negatively of their subjects external existence, whereas, necessity is a positive attribute. Furthermore, it cannot be said that the impossible things have no essence, and therefore cannot necessitate anything, because, as mentioned previously, there are two types, a type hypothesized by the mind but has no essence and one which is [existentially] established, or are rather divine names.

It was mentioned in the chapter of the Immutable Archetypes that necessity encompasses all external and noetic entities since a thing whose existence is not necessitated does not come into being, either in the external world, or in the mind. Thus, necessity can be subdivided into necessity in itself, and necessity by something else.

Know that this division is only with respect to the distinction between lordship and servitude. However with respect to absolute oneness, there is no necessity by something else, but only by the Essence. Everything that is necessary by something else is contingent by essence, and contingency has also encompassed it. The reason for its being described by contingency is to distinguish it. Were it not for this distinction, existence would be equivalent to His essential necessity.

Since the origin of these three relations is the plane of knowledge, some of the great scholars have maintained that the plane of contingency is the same as the plane of knowledge.

Even if these rational discussions that have been mentioned in this chapter as well as the previous chapters contravene with the apparent teachings of speculative philosophy, they are in fact its spirit from the lights of the prophetic presences, who are knowledgeable of the degrees of existence and their concomitants. For that reason, the people of Allah have not abstained from disclosing them, despite the rejection of their ideas by the pseudo-philosophers and their imitators. And Allah is the Truth and guides to the path.

Conclusion Concerning Entification:

Know that entification is that which distinguishes a thing from something else, such that it does not share it with another thing. It may be identical with the essence such as the entification of Necessary Being which distinguishes it by means of its Essence from other than it, and the entification of the Immutable Archetypes in knowledge, for they are also identical with their essences, since Being with a specific attribute on the plane of knowledge becomes Essence and an Immutable Archetype. It may be something additional to essence pertaining to it alone which distinguishes it from others, in the same way as a writer is distinguished from an illiterate in the attribute of writing. It may result from an attribute not pertaining to it, such as an illiterate who is distinguished from a writer insofar as he cannot write. The former includes considering the presence of an attribute while not considering the lack of another attribute, such as Zayd's ability to write without considering his lack of ability for tailoring, or considering the presence of an attribute while at the same time considering his lack of another attribute.

Entification that is addition to essence may be either existentially positive or negative, or may be a compound of positive and negative. One type may encompass all other types because a human, for example, distinguished in essence from a horse, and by the presence of an existential attribute—in one of his manifestations—is distinguished externally through another existential attribute, such as merciful Zayd and oppressive 'Amr. That which is apparent by means of an existential attribute is distinguished from that which is apparent from a non-existential attribute, like the most-knowledgable and the utterly ignorant. Likewise* a writer who is not a tailor is distinguished from a tailor who is not a writer by a existential attribute in addition to the non-existence of another attribute, and vice-versa.

Entifications additional [to essence] are all concomitants of Being, just as non-existential attributes differing from one another are distinct from the aspect of its mental existence of the perceiver, or from the aspect of its properties. Therefore, it cannot be said that were distinction between entities only due to their entification, they would not differ with respect to their essences; rather, their essences are shared in the same way that individual human beings share a unified reality. We say that essences become essences only by noetic entification, whereas, before entification, they are none other than the divine Essence, which is absolute being, as mentioned by the prophet (peace and blessing be upon him), "Allah was, and there was nothing else with Him."