Sultan Mawlana Abu-r-Rabi'a Sulayman: The Champion of Orthodoxy (1206/1792-1238/1822)  

"He was a just man and active erudite. He took Sidna Shaykh Tijani’s order following the authorization of the Prophet (peace and blessing be upon him) who testified to him that he was of his lineage. He witnessed prodigies from Sidna Shaykh, which strengthened his belief in him. Sultan Sulayman also refused to believe the words of Sidna Shaykh’s detractors – and indeed those were numerous. It has been reported he often asked Sidna Shaykh to allow him to see the Prophet (peace and blessing be upon him) while being awake. Sidna Shaykh answered: ”I am afraid you might no be able to withstand it.” He persisted in his request until Sidna Ahmed Tijani, unable to convince him to give up the idea, finally accepted his wish. First of all, he advised him to keep it secret and specially reserve a pure and empty place for this encounter, and to be alone. When, after he prepared everything in accordance with the recommendations of the Shaykh he decided to enter the place, an intense fear mixed with respect seized him. He therefore was unable to stay inside alone to do the particular dhikr he received from Sidna Shaykh. Under the effect of his emotions, he asked Sidna Ahmed Tijani to personally assist him. Shaykh agreed to go with him inside that place devoted to welcoming the Prophet (peace and blessing be upon him). It was while he was reciting the dhikr that an intense light, springing from Mohammedian lights, filled up the place. Being unable to withstand the intensity of that light, Sultan Sulayman fainted. When he awoke, he found Sidna Shaykh Tijani’s palm rest on his chest. Shaykh told him: “You are well, and the Prophet (peace and blessing be upon him) guarantees you this and that.” Sultan Sulayman replied: “May Allah reward you in blessings. Indeed you warned me that I would not withstand the encounter, which I personally experienced.” (Al-Qadi Sidi Ahmed Skirej in Kashf al-Hijab 'amman talaaqa bi-Shaykh Tijani mina-l As'hab )  

The sultan Abu al-Rabi’a Mawlana Sulayman b. Sultan Mohammed (qaddasa Allah-u Sirrahu al-Aziz) is one of the most enigmatic figures in Moroccan history, a figure as shaded as his time. Known for his extreme piety, staunch puritanism and sense of justice, he is often referred to as the Omar b. 'Abd al-'Aziz of his period; a rather signifi­cant comparison indicating the lasting effect of his father Sidi Mohammed ibn Abdellah's reformist spirit. His advent was then the culmination of all the energies that Sunnism had generated since the reforms of Sidi Mohammed in its protracted campaign against Taqlid and popular Islam alike.

Even more significant is the ethnic cleavage between Berbers and Arabs reported by the historians of the Dynasty, and described as a losing battle led by the Makhzan against the forces of darkness ("Ahl al-Dalal wa al-dhulumat"). Speaking of the Berbers, the Tijani figure al-Faqih Mawlana Ahmed ibn Mohammed Akansus describes in his al-Jaysh al-'Aramram the Berbers as having united against all Arabic-speaking people: "Wa ijtama'u 'ala muqatalat kul man yatakallam bi al-'arabiyya."

Moreover, the plague of 1213/1798 which decimated the Makhzan's army and its intelligentsia, the subse­quent push towards the Atlantic plains of powerful Middle Atlas Berber iconfederations (Ait Idrisen, Gherwan) and the repeated capture of the Sultan by the forces of dissidence, had a jolting effect on the Makhzan's foundations. It not only revealed the auda­city of the Siba and its blatant disregard for the crime of Lese-majeste, but it demonstrated also the impotence of the Emperor in maintaining, however superficial, the allegiance of his subjects.

But like his father Mawlay Sulayman had a lofty ideal: to continue every effort at regenerating the Moroccan society through the teaching of the fundamen­tals of pristine Islam (Ihya’ sunnat al-khulafa' al-Rashidin). To him only a change in the attitudes and values would help uproot deep seated fallacies created by the religious populism of the Sufis. His un­compromising directness in religious matters led him to adopt Draconic measures against the counter-current of innovation (bida’a), in order to establish Morocco's religious authenticity based on a true Islamic order.  

The Sultan's program however inspired only super­ficial loyalty. Although staunchly conservative, his resolution appeared too revolutionary and his summon to righteousness and purity too radical. In a sense Mawlay Sulayman went even further than his father in his re­formism and in doing so has reverted to a Madhhabist attitude which was religiously intolerable, for it clashed with the unswervingly Maliki Fuqaha', shattering their traditional support and inhibiting the effectiveness of the policy. Hence, Mawlay Sulayman could not escape the night­mare that shadowed his meritorious endeavor, namely the unholy alliance between the scripturalists and the brotherhood. The perpetual foreign pressure, the Napoleonic threat and the Makhzan’s desperate need for added sources of income all contributed to the unbear­able affliction that weakened the Sultan's grip on the affairs of his realm.

Perhaps it was Sulayman’s inveterate preference of purity over permanence that exploded into a series of unpropitious events that led the Empire to the brink of a second Maraboutic crisis. But the 'physical per­manence’ of the Dynasty survived and in effect never was truly questioned. The emotionalism of the tumultuous years of Mawlay Sulayman's rule inevitably bore lasting scars, for the Sultan was the only 'Alawite ruler ever to experience successive humiliations. But to his credit, his sin­cerity, theism, and humility were exemplified by friends and foe alike.

A. The Impeccable Muslim Imam: "Shams al-Imam, Rabi'a al-Qulub wa al-Azman"

The death of Sultan Sidi Mohammed left a familiar power is struggle culminating with the advent of the sangu­inary and superstitious Mawlay al-Yazid b. Sidi Mohammed (1204/1789-1206/1792) who succeeded in bringing Morocco back to the brink of anarchy. Moreover, the revolt of the various pretenders against al-Yazid, the death of the latter, the subversion of foreign powers and the subsequent crisis for succession had left the realm in a state of internal disarray.  

 

The Holy Sultan Mawlana Sulayman was unfortunately never able to perform the long coveted trip to Macca. In 1205/1790 while a Khalifa at Marrakech, he had requested permission to travel to the East. His request however was rejected by Mawlay al-Yazid who ordered him to remain in Fez. When he became Sultan, Sulayman increased the number of Hajj caravans and encouraged his sons and relatives to accomplish their devotional duty. In 1212/1797 he angered the Fasis who traditionally supplied the Amir al-Rukb, by destituting their Hajj Qaddur Asfir and replacing him by a man from Meknes Shaykh al-Tahir Badu al-Miknasi. The move was aimed at reducing the economic might of the Fasis and their monopoly over the Hajj trade, but Sulayman argued that the position was never meant to be lineal.

Much like his father, Mawlay Sulayman was a Salafist at heart. But his preternatural imperturba­bility allowed him to seek the most direct answers in his search for the paradigm of the founding Salaf. Mawlay Sulayman pursued his father's strong em­phasis on intellectual circles for the purpose of Munadhara or religious debates. The casuistic argumentations would center among other things on the Musnads particularly that of Ibn Hanbal, the two Sahihs and al-Ghazali's Ihya'.       He enjoyed particularly the ratio­cinations of Shaykh al-Ruhuni and Abu Zakariyya Yahya b. al-Mahdi al-Shafshawuni (the Imam of Mawlay Idriss' sanc­tuary) as well as the wrangling of two disputants, Abul Abbas Ahmad b. al-Mukhtar and Sidi Mohammed b. 'Abd al-Salam al-Dar'i. The sophistry of the well-known Sufi teacher Sidi Mubarak Atkrimat al-Murrakushi would engender some incisive and vivacious discussions.

In 1209/1795 Mawlay Sulayman demanded that four Fasi Ulama should analyze forty Hadiths by al-Nawawi. The group included al-Tawudi b. Suda, al-Tayyib b. Kiran, 'Abd al-Qadir b. Shaqrun al-Fasi and al-Tahir Bannis. The opinions and deductions of the group presided by the Sultan himself led to a 'fascinating' colloquy which was followed by the exegesis of Ibn Murahhal's Nazm by Shaykh al-Tahir b. Abi Bakr b. Suda. Al-Tayyib b. Kiran's dissertation on the meaning of 'Qul huwa Allah ahad…' at the Zawiya of Ibn Rahmun and in the presence of the Sultan along with other Muhaddiths is also noted as having been an important religious debate. Mawlay Sulayman rewarded his 'Ulama' with generous gratifications, particularly after each intellectual dis­cussion. In 1213/1798 he nominated Ibn Kiran at the Chair of al-Qarawiyyin where he taught Tafsir. Abu Abd 'Allah al-Jirari (d. 1240/1824) was given numerous presents for his commentary on Ibn al-Wannan's (d. 1187/1773) Shamaqmaqiyya. So did Abu 'Abd 'Allah Mohammed b. Idriss al-Azimmuri (1209/1794-1264/1847) for his poetry on the Mawludiyyat, and Abu 'Abd 'Allah Mohammed b. Mohammed al-Tuhami b.  Amr al-Ribati (died in the Hijaz in 2143/18 27) for his Rihla al-Hijaziyya, his Qafiyya and his poems dedicated to the glory of the Prophet, the 'Amriyya.

Mawlay Sulayman paid great attention to the educa­tional program at al-Qarawiyyine. He enjoyed mingling with the students, particularly during their various scholastic exercises and celebrations. Sulayman's children benefited from their father's care for the 'Ulum al-Din. His son Mawlay Ibrahim (d. 1234/1818) for example, showed a great promise in the field of scholastics and history. In a letter ad­dressed to his son Ibrahim, Sulayman reveals his profound attachment to a 'sound doctrine' as well as his inclination to Sufism. The Sultan enumerates a list of requirements which according to him should begin with the assiduous reading of al-Ghazali's Ihya', followed by Ibn al-Kathir's Tafsir and then by regular prayers.

But when he learned that his other son, Mawlay Mohammed did not demonstrate the same sedulousness as his brother, he enjoined him to reside in Fez and to "immerse himself in the study of Hadith." One of the most noteworthy attempts at reform initiated by the Sultan is perhaps his reinstatement of Mukhtasar Khalil. The move may seem surprising at first if one considers Sidi Mohammed's efforts at lessen­ing the Mukhtasar's ascendancy in the Maghrib. However Sulayman believed that the manual which condensed the four main sources of Maliki law (Mudawwanat Sahnun, al-Utbi's 'Utbiyya, Ibn al-Khatib's Wadhiha and the Maw'iziyya), was still the most preferred way to 'orthodoxize' the masses, thereby indicating that Sidi Mohammed's experiment did not succeed completely. Remarks al-Hajwi: "Mawlay Sulayman's action is similar to that of the Marinids who forced their people to abandon Ijtihld in order to follow strictly the narrow path of Malikism.”

In 1213/1798 the Sultan ordered his Muhtasib al-Hajj Mohammed b. Zakkur to assemble a group of Talibs well versed in the Mukhtasar, and to disseminate them throughout the country with the task of edifying their coreligionists. The importance of the Jami' al-Sahih of al-Bukhari was also stressed by Mawlay Sulayman as coming in third position of importance after the Qur'an and the Hadith. It appears however that copies of the Sahih were scarce. We are told that a Marabout by the name of Sidi 'Ali b. Yusuf al-Dar'i had retrieved a copy from the Zawiya al-Nasiriya, thus generating severe criticism from some quarters (a certain Faqih Sidi Mohammed) stat­ing that because of the sparseness of the facsimile, it should have been kept at the Zawiya of Dar'a.

In matters of Fiqh, only 'authentic' sources were advocated by the Sultan, particularly those of As'ad b. al-Furat and Ibn Qasim. He also ordered the propaga­tion of al-Sabki's Jami al-Jawami', Ibn 'Asim's Tuhf at al-Ahkam, the Lamiyyat al-Af'al by Ibn Malik, the Mu'in by Ibn 'Ashir, the famous Risala by Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani and the Bughyat al-Du'at as well as the al-Itqan fi 'Ilm al-Qur'an by al-Suyyuti. The Kitab al-Shifa' of Qadi 'Iyyad was of course an integral part of the curriculum.

Another curious aspect of Sulayman's religious in­fluence is found in the recrudescence of the celebration of the Mawlid, which had not seen such vigor since the days of the Marinids. The occasion would usually assemble various deputations of Talibs and Shurafa for long sessions of prayers and recitations. However any festivities which 'overstepped the limits of religious decency' were vigorously discouraged.

From what one can see of Sulayman's intention to initiate reforms, one is forced to conclude that his pro­gram was neither revolutionary nor innovative, but more in line with the conservative mood of the country. But what about Mawlay Sulayman’s attitude vis-a-vis the Tariqas? Mawlay Sulayman's Sufi fibers were in a sense more attuned to the world of Zuhd, but a quietism aimed only at seeking the spirit of the Prophet. He indeed con­sidered al-Ghazali’s Ihya' as well as al-Jazouli's Dalail al-Khayrat as an important component of 'Ilm. He ordered Shaykh al-Tayyib b. Kiran to include the Ihya' and the Dalail in the curriculum of every Talib.

The Sultan therefore viewed the revival of 'ortho­dox' Sufism as totally compatible with the doctrine of the Salaf, and certainly in accordance with the early Hanbali position on mysticism. Mawlay Sulayman then, did not reject the Tariqa format adopted by the purificationist orders in the East, nor did he reject that of the Nasiriya, the Wazzaniya or even the Sharqawa in Morocco, so long as it complied with the Tariqa Mohammediya spirit. Only Sidna Shaykh Abul Abbas Tijani had best characterize the Sultan's posture on Sufism: an aversion for syncretism.

However, Mawlay Sulayman was adamant in his declared war against Maraboutism or what he termed "al-Ghulat min ahl al-bida. Sulayman's attitude vis-a-vis the popular Tariqas was perhaps more blunt and less tolerant than that of his father: "Wa kana shadid al-nakir 'ala ahl al-fasad… wa kana yanza'ij idha sami'a fahisha."  He also rejected hereditary Maraboutism.

To be sure, Mawlay Sulayman's approach to Sufism was still traditional in nature and in a sense somewhat parochial. He believed for example in tomb visitations so long as it was done in conformity with the Shari'a (tombs of Ibn Mashish and al-Yusi): "Ziyarat al-maqabir min al-sunna li annaha nafi'a li al-qulub, wa hiya min afdal al-mandubat." Mawlay Sulayman admitted also the possibility of Karamat on the part of some deceased Awliya'. Maraboutism however was deemed diabolical and was thus attacked as a cause of decadence and as a corrupter of faith, for it incorporated rituals not found in orthodox Zuhd.

The Sultan who had a profound aversion for anything resembling a Bid'a did more than simply discredit certain illicit practices. In 1223/1808, after learning that orgiastic ceremonies were taking place at the Zawiya of Ibn Tuzin, he immediately sent an expedition to punish the heretics. Earlier, in 1210/1795, Qa'id al-Jilani b. al-Mufaddal, accused, under orders from the Sultan, the Marabout Sidi 'Ali b. Ahmad al-Hassani for having allowed his Zawiya to become 'a pole more sacred than Macca or Madina.

Al-Zayyani who generally reflected Sulayman's con­cern with blamable innovations, warned against those Fuqara' who pretended to be orthodox: "Their avowed karamat are nothing but a step further in their assured road to perdition…" He also launched an astringent denunciation against all enraptured orders performing entrancing exercises:    "Indeed the most despicable and most ignorant people are those who gather in groups to recite the Dhikr while standing, contorting themselves and trampling in cadence and who dance while eating the kuskus… how irreverent they are towards God, and how sacrilegious are the things they have attributed to the religion."

As for the two major Tariqas of the time, the Tijaniya and the Darqawa, Mawlay Sulayman joined the former and seems to have adopted initially a forbearing stand towards the latter. In renewing the spiritual forces of the time, the Tijaniya was widely supported by the elite (Shurafa, ulama, kibar al-tujjar) in the major centers of the kingdom and the Maghreb. In turn the Darqawa began by attracting new followers among the affiliates of the Shadhiliya. In Algeria it had acquired a reputation for sedition which proved later to be detrimental to Mawlay Sulayman's rule. In 1220/1805, following al-Muqaddam Mohammed Benshrif al-Falliti al-Wahrani’a mutiny against the Dey of Algiers, the latter solicited Mawlay Sulayman's intervention in the dispute. The Sultan ordered the Shaykh Mawlay al-Arabi al-Darqawi (d. 1239/1823) to leave for Oran accompanied by al-Hajj al-Tahir Badu, with the task of persuading the rebellious Muqaddam to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict.

But al-'Arabi al-Darqawi, hoping to please the Sultan, joined the rebels in Oran and Tlemcen and con­vinced them to say the Khutba in the name of Mawlay Sulayman, thus infuriating the Dey. The delegation then returned to Fez accompanied by a deputation from Tlemcen to offer the Bay'a to the Sultan. Although flattered by the request, Sulayman re­jected it as being unworthy of him in the light of al- 'Arabi's deceptive methods. He sent the mission back to Tlemcen after recommending its members to the clemency of the Dey. As for Mawlay al-'Arabi al-Darqawi, the Sultan enjoined him to remain in Fez.

In the absence of the sultan the people of Fez declared Sulayman’s nephew Ibrahim ibn Yazid sultan of Morocco. Not all the scholars or other people accepted this interpretation, but among the people who pledged allegiance to the new ruler were al-Arabi al-Wazzani and al-Arabi al-Darqawi who was to avenge himself by joining the Fez rebellion which almost en­gulfed the Dynasty. The Sultan was taken aback; if it had ever been his intention to abdicate, this was no longer the case, so he laid siege to Fez to reassert his authority. He has the support of some circles in Fez including his master Mawlana Shaykh Tijani. The pro-Ibrahimic circles sent al-Darqawi to Fez al-Jadid to ask them to join their side. Instead, they put him in prison where he was to stay for two years, being only released after Sidna Shaykh Tijani’s direct intervention. The siege of Fez lasted for more than ten months, maintaining an effective blockade and in the end bringing the rebels to defeat. Only in 1237 was this series of Fez revolts over, just a year before the Sultan died and was replaced by a nephew, Mawlay Abderrahman ibn Hicham.

B. Mawlay Sulayman, the Imam al-'Alim and the 'Ulama' of the Period

As stated earlier, Mawlay Sulayman was an erudite who took great care in the study of theology and who is acknowledged as having been intellectually gifted. Indubitably the beneficial influence of Sidi Mohammed ibn Abdellah on the young prince had an intense influence on his religious consciousness. The continuous injection of ideas brought by the various 'Ulama' from the East, his father's intellectual circles, and the high level of erudition of his professors, had a determining bearing on his intellect. It was not long before Mawlay Sulayman began expressing his religious inclination in numerous glosses and commentaries. To be sure, Sulayman's literary production does not reflect the same sense of mission that Sidi Mohammed aspired to. He shared however with his father the same execration he had to­wards all heterodox practices. Thus his obsession with the prevalent Bid'a of his time dominated his essays. 

By far his most famous work is his Inayat Ula li al-Majd, dedicated to one of his teachers, Mohammed ibn 'Abd al-Salam al-Fasi. In its three chapters, the 'Inaya discusses the origins of the Fasi al-Fihris (of which Shaykh Yusuf al-Fasi is a member), their emigra­tion from Andalusia to Morocco, their most prominent Ulama and their genealogy. The book is clearly a panegyric and a riveting reflection of the author's un­swerving esteem for the elite of Fez. The revolt of the Fasis against the Sultan in the latter part of his reign will have a devastating effect on his decision to abdicate.

Sulayman's other famous essay is his Hawashi 'ala Sharh al-Kharshi, a magisterial gloss em­blematic of his dedication to the Spirit of the Sunna. The work demonstrates also the author's great attachment to the Mukhtasar, seen as an important tool in the edifi­cation of the masses. But it is on the bid that Sulayman concentrated most of his efforts, and took a somewhat lonely course in his undeviating strictness, particularly in matters of arts (music). His steadfast denunciation of all profane arts as a sin shows his vigorous reaffirmation of an eternal competition: "Tawhid… faces a rival in any intense art… music…, poetry…all intense, symbol-bearing art can channel off, dissipate emotional energies which the Shari’a-minded minded wants to see reserved for the One and its moral demands as formulated in the Shari’a."

Thus in his Taqayid fi Hukm al-Ghina', Mawlay Sulayman criticizes those 'Ulama' who attend 'concerts' (Majalis al-ghina' bi al-'ud wa al-rabab). Singing, according to the Sultan is nothing less than a bid'a (blameworthy innovation), and to listen to a female voice is Haram for it is demonism (Min murad al-Shaytan) which encourages fornication (wa al-ghina' da'iyatun li al-zina).

The writer then narrates the origins of singing. The enemies of Islam, the polytheists, pantheists, and apostates have, according to Sulayman, conspired to divert the Muslim mind from its religious duties: "Wa al-ghina' ittakhadhuhu al-zanadiqa li yushghilu bihi al-muslimin ‘an kitab Allah." He then unleashes his anger at the brotherhoods responsible for orgiastic gatherings "where singing, hand clapping, intemperate dancing, and epicurean… festivities are all done while reciting the Dhikr."  In this, according to Sulayman, lay a deleterious danger for the Shari'a and a grave insult to God. The gifts of Satan make us forget what we are, by corrupting our imagination and destroying our communion with Allah.

Another commanding work is Sulayman's Risala fi Hukm al-Ghina, no doubt modeled after Ibn Taymiyya's Kitlb al-Sama' wa al-Raqs. Here again the central idea is the danger that music can create in the human soul, bringing with it the chaos of unbelief which reasserts itself in its most hideous form: "Singing," emphasizes Sulayman, "is forbidden for it unsettles the heart, thus encouraging repellent acts and odious vices that are contrary to the Sunna and which would enable Lucifer to triumph." Sulayman then lists all the musical instruments considered as a Bid'a (Mazamir, Rabab, etc.); hand clapping on any given occasion is also an innovation. Poetry is acceptable so long as it does not dwell on liquor or women (bidun dhikr al-khumur wa al-nisa'…).  

There follow several citations from Calif Omar b. 'Abd al-'Aziz regarding profane music and chanting. Sulayman reiterates his condemnation of all ecsta­tic orders which use music in their religious rituals, and calls on everyone to follow the customs of the Salaf or else be "anathematized to eternal fire." The deliverance of all worshippers from the tyranny of the "powers of darkness" reminds Sulayman, is the duty of every true believer. The Imta' al-Isma' deals basically with the same topic that is the pervasive influence of music on the purity of devotion. Sulayman accuses the rulers in Islam of having allowed the symbols of degeneracy (Ash'ir al-Fasad) to prevail over religious quintessence.

The use of war drums (Tabl al-Harb) according to the Sultan, is admissible (La yajri fihi al-khilaf…) because it strengthens the will against the enemy (Lima fihi min al-taqwiya 'ala al-'aduww). As for the glorification of humans in songs and poems it is forbid­den by the Shari'a as are gallant poems dedicated to the physical attributes of ladies. Mawlay Sulayman wrote another gloss on the propri­ety of singing which he called Ta'lif fima huwa Mukhtalab fihi min al-Ghina'. In it the Sultan quotes abundant­ly the opinions of Imam Malik, al-Bukhari and Sahnun.

Interestingly enough, al-Du'ayyif reports the fact that Mawlay Sulayman allowed the Fasis to sing and play musical instruments only once, due to his son's wedding, and that on rare occasions he had allowed himself the pleasure of listening to music played on the 'Ud and Santur. It is worth noting that a few decades later, the problem of the morality and legality of music was still debated. Witness for example the work of Abu Ishaq. In his Aghanl al-Saqqa, Abu Ishaq Ibrahim b. Abd al-Qadir al-Tadili (d. 1311/1894), following a des­cription of the people of the Haramayn's habits during banquets (bi munasabat al-walima wa al-diyafa), exposes the Hanbali and Maliki positions on music. Abu Ishaq however makes a distinction between the initiate who can allow himself the pleasure of music be­cause of his awareness of the laws governing it (Mubah li al-ladhin ya'rifun al-qawa'id) and the ignorant who might awaken the devil in him (Tahyij al-Shaytan).

Mawlay Sulayman is also the author of numerous epistles and letters of various importance. For example his Taqyid fi Bayan Jawaz al-tabkhir… deals with the permissibility of the use of incense during Ramadan.  Another epistle, Risala 'an Hal Mutafaqqirat al-Waqt, describes the various innovations introduced and performed by some Sufis. Sulayman's close associates and confidents such as Faqih al-Makki al-Ghazi, Faqih Sidi Ahmad b. Khadra, al-Salawi al-'Umari (d. 1230/1814), Faqih Sidi al-Hajj Mohammed Bu Jida al-Ribati (d. 1230/1814), Sidi al-Maa'ati b. al-Tayyib b. Marin (d. 1223/1808) and Qadi Abu 'Abd Allah Mohammed b. al-Shaykh Abi al-Asbagh 'Isa b. al-Shaykh, have all contributed with Sulayman in his written denunciation and censure of fiendish acts.

Sulayman addressed also an array of letters some of which have gained notoriety for their sharpness. Such is the case of the missive delivered to Shaykh al-'Arabi b. al-Ma'ati ibn Salih al-Sharqi al-Umari in which the Sultan soliloquizes the culprit: "You have strayed from the Jama’a and have demonstrated a certain supineness in regard to the orders given to you by the one who must be obeyed… We therefore enjoin you to remain in Fez…"

Two other letters are worth mentioning because they both show the Sultan's vivid interest in the spread of the Sunna in sub-Sahara Africa. One is addressed to Shaykh Mohammed al-Baqiri b. al-Sultan Mohammed al-'Adal (d. 1225/1810); and the second to Shaykh 'Uthman b. Mohammed b. 'Uthman b. Salih al-Fulani, praising them both for their arduous work in the service of Islam. If Sulayman's literary legacy is neither impressive nor momentous, it nonetheless exhibits a salient point, namely a deepened awareness that the forms of disbelief are protean. In his own time and way, Sulayman’s inten­tion was to provide a guideline on specific contempora­neous issues, which would protect the Muslim from the chaos of his earthly passions.

There were also several 'Ulama' in the period who left noteworthy productions consisting mostly of compila­tions, biographies or glosses dealing with Hadith. To be sure, the plague of 1213/1791 is largely responsible for the paucity of literary efflorescence, and although Sulayman, following the calamity, did make an effort to train a new generation of learned men, the Moroccan intelligentsia remained irreversibly weakened.

Abu al-'Abbas Ahmad b. Mahammad al-Fasi (1166/1753-1213/1799) who died of the plague, is a fairly noted Rahhala who wrote interesting anecdotes about his sojourn in Egypt and the Haramayn. Abu Malik was also an honored Muhaddith who had participated in Sidi Mohammed's learned circles. Another distinguished 'Alim, Abu Malik 'Abd al-Wahid al-Fasi (1172/1758-1213/1799) left also his marks as a talented Muhaddith, a biographer, and a poet. A product of the teachings of Ibn Shaqrun (d. 1219/1804), Abu Malik was nominated as head preacher by Sulayman at the newly built al-Rasif Mosque in Fez. He was also a casualty of the plague. The Muhtasib Abu 'Abd'Allah Mohammed b. 'Abd al-Salam al-Fasi (1130/1718-1214/1799), is famous for his reformist campaign in the Sus region, where he supervised the correct teaching of the Quran and the Hadith.

He is credited with the Sharh Lamiyyat al-Af'al, of Ibn Malik and a gloss entitled Hashiya 'ala al-Ja'bari. Abu 'Abd 'Allah was one of the Sultan's professors. Together with Abu 'Abd 'Allah Mohammed b. 'Abd al-Wahhab Ibn 'Uthman al-Miknasi (d. 1213/1799), secretary, minister, and Rahhala under Sidi Mohammed and Mawlay Sulayman, there were four important scholars who sur­vived the plague and who contributed to the revivalist program of the Sultan. Shaykh Abu 'Abd 'Allah Mohammed al-Tayyib b. 'Abd al-Majid b. 'Abd al-Salam Ibn Kiran al-Fasi (1172/1758-1227/1812) is perhaps the best known jurist and Muhaddith of the period. Considered the best Hafiz since al-Suyyuti, Ibn Kiran is the product of the school of al-Tawudi b. Suda and Mahammad b. al-Hassan al-Bannani. Ibn Kiran was not only the Sultan's most trusted advisor, he is also credited with the reformist push undertaken by the Sultan in accordance with Salafi tenets. He has written several commentaries, including one on al-Ghazali's Ihya' and another on the Alfiyya of Ibn Malik. He is also the author of a popular opiscule called 'Aqd Nafa'is al-La'ali fi Tarikh al-Himam al-'Awali,  aimed at the exhortation of the believers and which was written under Mawlay Sulayman’s orders.

Another notable scholar is Shaykh Mohammed b. 'Ali Yaqub Yusuf b. Ali al-Hajj Bariksha al-Ruhuni al-Wazzini (1159/1746-1230/1815). Although a mystic initi­ated to the Tariqa al-Wazzaniyya by Shaykh 'Ali b. Ahmad b.  al-Tayyib al-Wazzani (d. 1226/1811), al-Ruhuni was nonetheless a rigorous Muhaddith and a reputed jurist who had been delivered an Ijaza by the illustrious al-Tawudi b. Suda. Shaykh al-Ruhuni taught at the school of al-Haddarin in Meknes and was among the professors who influenced Mawlay Sulayman’s Sufi inclinations. He contributed in the sphere, of Maliki Fiqh and wrote a monograph called al-Tahassun wa al-Man' min man I'taqada anna al-Sunna Bid'a, as well as a pamphlet based on Abd al-Baqi b. Yusuf al-Zurqani's commentary of the Mukhtasar, in which he denounced the error of judgment of his predecessor.

Shaykh Abu al-Fayd Hamdun b. 'Abd al-Rahman b. Hamdun b. 'Abd al Rahman Mohammed Ibn al-Hajj al-Sulami al-Mirdasi al-Fasi (1174/1760-1232/1817) is undoubtedly the best known figure at Mawlay Sulayman's court. Indeed he was named the official Faqih of the Court. A Tijani mystic, a Muhaddith, and a jurist, Shaykh Hamdun b. al-Hajj was also a renown poet. He composed a panegyric for the Sultan which he named Diwan al-Nawafi' al-Ghaliya fi al-Mada'ih al-Sulaymaniyya.

Sidi Hamdun b. al-Hajj was a member of the Ahl al-Hadith generation who benefited from the teachings of the aforementioned Ibn Kiran, al-Tawudi b. Suda, Ibn al-Hassan al-Bannani, Ibn Shaqrun and Mohammed b. 'Abd al-Salam al-Dar'i. Extremely pious, Ibn al-Hajj earned himself a reputation for dogmatic zealotry and inflexibility, and as such was a much feared Muhtasib in Fez. Similarly, his Qa'idship of the Gharb region turned into an obdurate campaign against the 'unscripturalists'. Ibn al-Hajj is the author of a commentary on Ibn Hajar al-'Asqalani's Muqaddima and a gloss on al-Taftazani's treatise on the Mukhtasar, as well as a series of Diwan including the controversial poem dedicated to Amir Sau'ud b. 'Abd al-'Aziz.

There are two more scholars of important stature that merit mentioning: they are Abu 'Abd 'Allah Mohammed b. 'Abd al-Salam al-Fasi (d. 1239/1824) and Abu Hamid al-'Arabi b.  'Abd 'Allah b. Abi Yahya al-Massari (d. 1240/ 1825). The former was a respected jurist and a Sufi affili­ated with the Tariqa al-Nasiriya. As a Muhaddith, he exhibited the same fiery attitude as his teachers Ibn Suda, al-Bannani, and Idriss al-'Iraqi. Ibn Nasir traveled twice the East (1196/1781 and 1211/1796) and met with prominent 'Ulama' such as al-Dardir, al-Zabidi, al-Amir, al-Jawhari, etc. He is the author of two major Rihlas (al-Kubra wa al-Sughra) in which he criticizes religious teaching in the East. Ibn Nasir is equally reproachful of the state of affairs in the Maghrib, and his Kitab al-Mazaya fima Hadath min al-Bida’ bi Umm al-zawiya, is an expostulation of all Bida' found at Tamghrut.

As a disciple of al-Tawudi b. Suda and the protégé of Ibn Shaqrun and al-Ruhuni, al-Massari is remembered for his active interest in the field of education. He left a treatise in prose entitled Siraj Tullab al-'Ulum fi Adab Talab al-'Ilm wa al-Ta'allum wa al-Ta'lim dedicated to his students. The 'Ulama's literary contribution suggests a characteristic simplicity. Their cultural stance, while serious, does not possess the profundity nor the variety of the preceding period: none of them has attained a mythical stature: Sulayman's 'Ulama' however have brought a welcome sense of continuity in a country irreversibly drawn into the pre-colonial era.  

C. The Myth of Morocco's Isolation Under Sulayman: Victory of Trade Over Jihad  

Unlike Sultan Sidi Mohammed b. Abdellah the master manipulator, Mawlay Sulayman had always looked askance at Muslim-Christian relations, in view of the highly political nature of trade. There was however no such thing as 'neutral trade' and neutrality is what Mawlay Sulayman tried des­perately to preserve in view of the realm's limited means. When de Breugnon made his official visit in 1767, Sidi Mohammed was then tilting toward France. But under Sulayman, Britain had become the dominant power, forcing the Sultan to hedge his strategic bets on the British. The antagonism of the latter towards the French compelled them to intimidate the Sultan into choosing sides. So did the French who literally harassed the Sultan to take a hostile stand vis-a-vis England.  

Indeed French corsairs would periodically raid the Empire's coastal areas which did not always have the means to retaliate. As an example, the 'Ulama' of Tetuan, Tangier, and Larashe had informed the clerics of Fez that Christian privateers were infesting their area, and had implored them to obtain on their behalf arms from the Makhzan. The complainants further contested their disarmament in the face of danger arguing that it was contrary to the spirit of Jihad. The Fasi 'Ulama' in turn, fearful of Sulayman's reaction, solicited the intervention of Mawlay 'Abd al-Salam b. Mohammed to obtain the Sultan's consent.

Mawlay Sulayman however had to contend with the European power's constant quest for consumption goods. It was grain and livestock that they needed most. The regions of 'Abda and Dukkala were considered the greeneries of the 'Alawite Empire. But the summer blockade of the port of Safi (Asafi) by Sulayman^’s cruisers in an effort to curtail illegal trade had forced the Europeans to scramble for grain during the bad season. Observes James Matra the British Consul:

"There are at this time about thirty vessels loading corn in Safi belonging, to almost every European nation, all of which are expected to sail before the season permitted Muley Soliman his cruisers to be on the coasts.

Mawlay Sulayman for his part needed weapons to sub­due various tribes in dissidence, and grain and livestock were often traded for arms and frigates. We are told that in 1211/1796 Mawlay Sulayman requested from the British not only canons and gunpowder, but bayonets which were to be introduced for the first time in the Empire. To be sure Sulayman wanted to swing his realm back toward its old orthodox stand, with new constraints on foreign dealing.    His original design was in fact to counter his father's open contacts with the west that led to an increasing dependence on foreign trade and to a corrupting mood in the port cities. He needed however the levies on exports to pay for the sorely needed weapons that his army lacked.   Thus, for Sulayman trade became an inescapable necessity of survival.

Following his father's example, Mawlay Sulayman decided to concentrate the foreign merchants in Rabat in order to direct the trade, and indeed Rabat became a major port city with an "enclave economy."  "Fifty to sixty ships would congregate in the Rabat harbor after loading in Tetuan, Tangier, Larashe, Casablanca, Safi, and Mogador." The Sultan would then send his supervisors to perceive the duty on merchandises. Illegal transactions with third parties were strictly prohibited, and any contraband would be repossessed by the Makhzan and resold to the Europeans. However Makhzan officials would often resell the confis­cated grain at a lower but profitable rate and would then add a levy. Such was the case with 'Abd al-Malik b. Idriss in Casablanca, Hajj Mohammed b. al-'Arusi al-Dukkali who would dispose of the seized merchandises in the Tit. Similarly, the 'Amil at Mogador, Mohammed b. 'Abd al-Sadiq al-Bukhari was also trafficking with the Christians until his dismissal. Upon his removal Ibn Abd al-Sadiq owed the Makhzan one half million dollars which he had unlawfully obtained and "which he had used to further his own business."  

Smuggling had always been a way of life in every nautical outlet from Tangier to Agadir and various inde­pendent Lords such as 'Abd al-Rahman b. Nasir had traded openly with the Europeans with little Makhzan interference. However Makhzan officials were entrusted with the task of contributing to the government's coffer, not theirs. Sulayman would periodically punish his insubordinate 'Amins by jailing them and forcing them to pay heavy fines.

Sulayman had officially warned all foreign consuls to discontinue any commercial intercourse with mutinous tribes or dissident regional lords, particularly in the Rif region as well as in the Dukkala, 'Abda, Shayazma and Haha territories. In a forceful letter addressed to the British Consul Matra, Sulayman unveils his indignation: "It is a shame that those who pretend to be our friends should prefer the society of our depraved subjects." Occasionally, however, the Sultan would grant "special passports" to Christian vessels in need of additional grain, to trade outside the fold of government jurisdiction, provided they paid a levy to the Makhzan. Otherwise Christian ships caught trafficking were either attacked and burnt or escorted back to Rabat.

Rabat was intended to house the Christians and insulate them from the rest of the population. The Jews of Rabat and Sale were also forced to remain in their quarters. The concentration of Europeans in one city however, did not prevent its Muslim inhabitants from daily contacts with them. It became a thorny issue at the Court and prompted al-Du'ayyif to deplore the corrod­ing influence of the European presence, and blast at the Rabatis who entertained westerners in their homes and acquired a taste for European architecture.

In the interim the disastrous plague of 1213/1798-99 that swept the realm had depopulated the Dukkala and 'Abda provinces. Mogador and Safi were particularly hit. Ac­cording to a Mr. Cahill, a British merchant of the House of Layton and Co., of London, established at Safi, the ravages of the plague were catastrophic. Villages were depopulated, particularly on the coast, "much of the cattle was wandering wild about the country corn was left uncut." Even "the sight of cats and dogs was rare."

Since more males than females had died , Ibn Nasir al-'Abdi had decreed that all women from the age of 13 to the age of 20 should marry immediately to offset the population loss. Men in turn were encouraged to take four wives. Remarks Matra: "In the course of a fort­night there was not one instance of disobedience to his order." If we may trust Matra, four million people fell victim to the plague, which also appeared in the Rif region. Foreign merchants took great care in avoiding contamination, and in effect most Europeans sought refuge in Gibraltar.

Ironically, the calamity enabled Mawlay Sulayman to monopolize the commerce of grain and put an end to Ibn Nasir's fiefdom. Sulayman attempted to force European commercial houses in the region such as the House of Layton and Co., of London to leave Safi, either for Rabat or Mogador, where they would be under Makhzan supervision. The Sultan sought to revive Mogador as a leading trading town, which was soon flooded with large numbers of migrants, traders, and Jewish middlemen. His aim was obviously the suppression of the central provinces' illegal commerce.    He also felt the need to "purify" Rabat from the nefarious western influence, as Mogador's Muslim population was comparatively small.   

As late as 1231/1815 Mawlay Sulayman was to publicly denounce the conduct of "certain Muslims" in Rabat who had acquired a reputation for drunkeness and homosexuality" barring them from any further contact with the Christians. It is mainly for this reason that Mawlay Sulayman reversed his policy of confining all Jews in the Mallah, and encouraged them to become Makhzan agents (Mordacai de la Mar, Benhamoo, Maknin). However the move was also aimed at the curtailment of private business activities by Muslims.   When the Fasis protested, Sulayman retorted by citing the Muwatta' which states that Jews are allowed to be employed by the Makhzan if they have paid the Kharaj and the 'Ushur.

The plague however had had also an adverse effect on agriculture, and corn and wheat became scarce. It had destroyed as much as 30 percent of the critical 1214/1799 export crop, prompting the Sultan to halt its exportation for a short period, though provisions to the British garrison of Gibraltar remained uninterrupted. The insurrections in the Tadla region however, coupled with the opposition of a segment of the population to grain sales during the drought that followed the plague, forced Sulayman to limit all exportations. Even bullocks could only be purchased in exchange for gun powder (four heads per barrel).

The duty on other items such as wax, wool, and gum were also increased, and Moroccans could not engage in trade with the Europeans without a Makhzan warrant. Here again Sulayman had an opportunity to legally stifle the Franco-British conflict; for figures dealing with the local merchants, forcing the European nations to court Makhzan officials with clout.

Indeed, Moroccan intermediaries were extensively-used as private agents, including Jews. However, members of the ruling family, such as Mawlay al-Tayyib b. Sidi Mohammed (d.  1213/1798) did their utmost to discredit those agents hoping to force the Europeans into dealing with them directly. Consul Matra for example often complained about the greed of al-Tayyib, and preferred to employ a certain Talib Omar Yub, already named Tajir al-Sultan (the Sultan's merchant).

Mawlay Sulayman for his part offered Consul Matra the role of a business representative in the secret hope that he would accelerate Makhzan requests for weapons. In 1216/1801 Sulayman reiterated his offer to Matra, re­questing that he become his chief cattle trader with the garrison at Gibraltar. British Moroccan relations were on the whole excel­lent, and Mawlay Sulayman was always eager to send a delegation to London accompanied by gifts. The presents consisted usually of 10 stallions, a camel, and a lion. Remarks Matra with disdain: "Really not worth the straw they would eat in their passage home."

The ever enduring problem of captured vessels was always a sore point with the British and the rest of the European nations for that matter. Sulayman was often powerless in     rescuing the captured crew particularly if they had been abducted by Siba tribes or rival contenders. This in turn placed the British in a rather precarious position, for in order to purchase their coreligionists back they were forced to violate Sulayman's ban on rebel-foreigner relations. Sometimes too, British vessels would be loading grain illegally at a prohibited nautical outlet, and then intercepted by the Sultan cruisers. This in turn would engender some difficult apologies on the part of the Con­sul.

There was also the problem of foreign ships harbor­ing 'Moorish' flag which were often seized either by competing European powers or by Algerian pirates. Another source of conflict pertained to the debts contracted by governors of the local provinces during the civil war in the south, or by Makhzan officials during the interreg­num. Mawlay Sulayman refused categorically to reimburse the foreign merchants on the ground that the Makhzan could not be held accountable for any past transactions.

The British faced local problems also. In 1214/1799 following the inadvertent shooting of a Moroccan by a British sentinel in Tangier, the angry population put the consulate under siege. Observes Consul Matra:

"I do assure your grace [Duke of Portland] that I know of nothing so difficult to settle in Barbary as the shedding of Mahomedan blood by a Christian. Had this happened in Muley Yezid's time I am confident that [every] Christian of any denomination in the Empire would have been massacred, and Muley Soliman is a sufficient bigot to be very troublesome on the occasion."

The British always in search of a third party in their bid for preferential treatment at the Court, found a convenient connection in the person of Qa'id 'Abd al-Rahman 'Ash'ash, the governor of Tetuan whose reputation for fraudulence, delusion, and knavery rivaled that of Ibn Nasir. 'Ash'ash was to become one of the principal pro-British Makhzan officials, who maintained continuous ties with a British agent in Gibraltar, a Jewish merchant by the name of Benhamoo.

To the British, 'Ash'ash was valuable because of the proximity of Tetuan to Gibraltar, and because of his ability to obtain unlimited supplies. Similarly, the British concluded a secret agreement with al-Bashadur al-Hikmawi, governor of Larashe and with Vizir Mohammed al-Sallwi (d. 1230/1814-15) governor of Tangier, thus forming a useful arch of purveyance. However, in order to circumvent the growing list of intermediaries, Mawlay Sulayman insisted on paying Consul Matra directly for any purchase made in his name. The latter insisted that a new "treaty of cooperation, tariff, and preferential treatment" was in order. In the process, Matra, after an audience with the Sultan, renewed his anti-French propaganda, warning Sulayman about French designs in Spain, Gibraltar, and Morocco.  

French and Spaniards were also striving for the Sultan's favors. However the French pursued it more ag­gressively than the latter. Following the departure of Consul Chenier, France had only a charge d'affaires, Jean-Baptiste du Rocher (1786-1795), to represent its interests at the Moroccan court. Du Rocher however was enjoined to return to his native land and exonerate himself before the Committee of Public Safety during the terror. In 1210/1795 he was exculpated and then sent back to Morocco with presents and a message of good will from Napoleon I to Mawlay Sulayman. He was however kidnapped by a British vessel and thus never reached the realm.

In the interim the pugnacious French corsairs were repeatedly raiding the Moroccan coast, launching several attacks on Makhzan ships. Unable to retaliate effectively Sulayman sent in 1213/1798 two emissaries, Sidi al-Hljj 'Abd al-Rahman Zakur and al-Hajj Mohammed b. Salih al-Asfi, to the Directory (1795-1799). The French expressed their interest in having un­limited access to the grain market. Michel-Ange d'Ornano, stationed in Tangier since 1210/1795 with the title of commissaire des relations commerciales, had also expressed his government's interest to acquire an exclusive "outlet" in the Empire.

In 1222/1807 the French negotiated the purchase of 1,000 horses from Morocco and requested that the Sultan send them accompanied by a Moroccan ambassador, preferably Mawlay 'Abd al-Malik b. Idriss. The Sultan, guessing France's motives behind their insistence on Mawlay 'Abd al-Malik, sent instead al-Hajj Idris al-Rami al-Fasi en­joining him to offer the requested horses as presents to Napoleon. Napoleon reciprocated by sending Captain Antoine Burel with sumptuous gifts (diamond egret, clocks and watches, china, imperial tents). His mission was to sway the Sultan away from the British orbit, to solve the problem of French refugees from Spain whom the British wanted to see captured and executed, and finally to ex­plore the country in order to pave the way for a possible French invasion.

However Burel's discourteousness and peevish attitude toward Mawlay Sulayman (Burel ac­cused the Sultan of "perfidious neutrality') were to worsen Franco-Moroccan relations. Mohammed al-Bukhari al-Salawi (d. 1230/1814) was to openly declare the Sultan's displeasure with Napoleon's methods. In matters of commerce, Franco-Moroccan relations stagnated, because of the British quasi monopoly on the grain and spice trade. Moroccan exports to France (wax, leather) were so severely curtailed and heavily taxed that the Sharifian Makhzan was forced to halt it.  

Similarly, Moroccan subjects trading in France were often subject to harassment and delays. As for Spanish-Moroccan relations, they remained cordial, thanks to the pro-Spanish vizir Ibn 'Uthman. King Carlos IV (1788-1808) in fact continued the peaceful policy of his predecessor toward Morocco. In 1213/1799 a treaty of peace and friendship was ratified between Ibn 'Uthman and the Spanish consul Juan Manuel Gonzales Salmon (since Dec. 30, 1798), which re­newed Spanish privileges acquired during Sidi Mohammed's days.

The Spaniards nonetheless had attempted to reestab­lish their old connection with Safi to obtain corn for their company at Cadiz. In 1210/1795 Don Salmon had entered into negotiations with the notorious Ibn Nasir al-'Abdi. It is true that the same year Spain also presented the Sultan with a gift of $20,000 plus $30,000 worth of presents as well as $165,000 in tribute in order to soften the Sultan into granting Spain an exclusive trading privilege of all the realm's nautical outlets in return for a global duty paid in advance to him.

Although tempted by the proposition, Sulayman feared that it might antagonize the British, and thus offered the Spaniards to share a similar agreement with the British. But Spain rejected the proffer at first, and went on to capture Larashe where it formed an association called Los Grenios (graineries). Spain also looked at the province of the Rif for timber and hoped to be ceded Tangier in exchange for Ceuta (Sabta) which would have given Mawlay Sulayman a well fortified place overlooking the Rif.

Interestingly enough, Sulayman made no efforts to direct a Jihad action against Ceuta or Melilla, particularly during Napoleon's occupation of Spain. Unlike his father, Mawlay Sulayman had neither the means nor the power to launch an expedition against Ceuta. It is true that there were several advocates for an all out Jihad against the Christian stronghold, and even the Maghribi Rahhala Abu al-Ras al-Mu'askari who visited Morocco in 1216/1801 suggested in his Rawdat al-Silwan al-Mu'allafa bi Marsatitwin that Sulayman should reconquer Ceuta for the glory of Islam.

The Sultan in fact had resolved not to pursue Jihad against Christi­anity, despite his unwavering dedication to the concept. To begin with, the state of Sulayman’s army was pitiful, particularly after the plague. "Everyday," comments al-Du'ayyif, "scores of soldiers from the Sultan's army perish from the plague." Only 3,000 Udayas were to survive along with a handful of 'Abids. Moreover, it was the Sultan's men who had spread the disease throughout the realm, particularly to the Duk­kala and 'Abda region.    Notes Consul Matra rather drearily, "Bodies are being dragged by hooks into the streets and left there." The scope of the collapse of Sulayman's army is obvious when one examines the unrelenting efforts of the Sultan to equip his atrophied army with heavy artillery (Maharis, Bumba), at a time when his capacity to ex­port grain for guns had to be curtailed due to religious imperatives, political pressure and famine.

However Sulayman's inability to obtain his weapons without maintaining cordial relations with the Christian powers, particularly Britain, left the Makhzan faced with a cruel dilemma. Overwhelmed by the challenge created by the influx of mountainous tribes to the plague ravaged plains, and unable to properly collect his taxes, Mawlay Sulayman had to rely almost exclusively on foreign trade. Moreover the Napoleonic threat, taken very seriously by the Sultan, convinced the latter that to save the dynasty which seemed to plunge abruptly into mor­tal fallibility, England had to be treated considerately.

Indeed the French Revolution had a profound impact on the Muslim world as a whole. The ideas behind it, particularly secularism, were perhaps not fully under­stood, but French propaganda was nonetheless active and it soon became apparent that the French were preaching liberty (al-‘Hurriyya), equality (Taswiya), reason (Tahkim al-'Aql), all execrable Bida' from the Muslim point of view. Furthermore, the execution of Louis XVI was also an event that did not go unnoticed by Mawlay Sulayman 

Events in Egypt were also followed closely, and the fall of Cairo and Alexandria in 1213/1798 are reported by the various Moroccan chroniclers. Al-Jabarti reports the rumor that circulated announcing the arrival of 20,000 Maghribis determined to liberate Egypt from the 'heretic' Napoleon. To be sure the invasion of Egypt had a frightening effect on the Sultan, who suddenly became aware, along with the rest of Dar al-Islam, of the vulnerability and weakness of the Ottomans. Writes Consul James Matra:

"I have stated to the Emperor the proceedings of our enemies not only with the Sultan, but with every country where he can get a footing, and have pointed out the danger to his religion should any Christian power be master of Egypt, as the dominion of the Red Sea would of course follow and the safety of Mecca be endangered, the pilgrimage most pro­bably put an end to while that country was overrun by a race who, having abandoned   its   religion, was not likely to respect that of other people."

In the process, the prestige of the Padishah was of course badly tarnished. The revolt of the Algerians against their Turkish op­pressors further accentuated Arab-Turkish antagonism, which would explain in part Mawlay Sulayman's lack of communication with La Porte as well as his professed anti-Ottomanism. It must be noted here that relations with the Ottoman Empire diminished after the death of Sidi Mohammed. Indeed the last em­bassy that debarked from Constantinople was the one sent by Sidi Mohammed a year before his demise. Although the delegation returned with fine presents and a large cargo of coffee, Moroccan-Ottoman relations were never pursued by Mawlay Sulayman. In 1222/1807, Sultan Mustafa in an attempt to prevent a Russian invasion solicited the help of Sulayman in blocking the passage of Russian ships fleeing through the Straight of Gibraltar. Sulayman reluctantly agreed, but his ships were never able to intercept a single Russian vessel. Curiously enough, Mawlay Sulayman did not put forth a claim to the Caliphate.

Napoleon's ambitions in the Iberian Peninsula fur­ther emphasized Sulayman's fear that the French were bound on destroying the Hukm al-Shari'i in the neighboring countries. The British of course intensified their strident anti-French propaganda. British Consul James Mario Matra believed that in case of a French invasion, the Moroccan population would welcome it, an analysis which seemed to have been par­tially considered by the Sultan. Notes Matra:

A considerable majority of Moroccans would probably rejoice; the whole of the sea coast are traders and Republicans (presumably French agents). The Alcaids of the interior provinces are very loosely united to the court and disgusted with the insati­able avarice of their chief. [They] would unite with any invader on a promise of being retained in their power nor do I believe that six weeks after the landing of an enemy, the Emperor would have as many hundred men about him… The Emperor considers the British as the only power who can or will protect him in case he be attacked, and that consideration keeps him in good humor with us.

With the temporary interruption of the Hajj during the French occupation of Egypt, the restlessness of the Kabylia stimulated by the French consul-general in Algiers Dubois-Thainville [who portrayed Napoleon as the long awaited Mahdi determined to save the Kabyles from their Makhzan and French troop movement in Cadiz, Mawlay Sulayman had little alternative but to align him­self with the British. 

The whole Maghrib, particularly Morocco, were viewed in Paris as a potentially lucrative market and its conquest became a mania. It coincided with the mysterious arrival on the scene of the no less egregious 'Ali Bey al-Abbassi (Domingo Badia y Leblich, d. 1234/1818), who showed great interest in the agricultural potential of Morocco. In a series of adroit intrigues, the Spanish ad­venturer succeeded in infiltrating the Moroccan court and pave the way for a European invasion. He posed as an exiled subject from Syria and a Sharif, and armed with a letter of recommendation from the French minister of foreign affairs, Charles Maurice Talleyrand-Perigord (1797-1807), landed in Tangier in 1218/1803.

Ali Bey was soon able to cultivate a friendship with Ma wily Sulayman to whom he allegedly demonstrated the necessity of a Franco-Spanish-Moroccan alliance which would have presumably protected the 'Alawites from some ephemeral pretender. Badia is also reported as having tried to convince Sulayman and his brother 'Abd al-Salam of the necessity to have a constitutional monarchy, but because of the opposition of Vizir Sidi Mohammed al-Salawi and that of Mawlay 'Abd al-Malik, the Sultan rejected the suggestion as unIslamic.  

Badia's influence at Mawlay Sulayman's court seems preposterous. For one thing Moroccan chroniclers are totally silent on the event. Moreover to assume that an adventurer, regardless of his talent for dissimulation and imposture, could have mystified a man as perspi­cacious and provident as Mawlay Sulayman is to misinter­pret Moroccan subtle court manners for stolidity and fatuity. Nonetheless, French designs on the realm were taken with the utmost seriousness.    Indeed al-Du'ayyif does mention rumors of an impending French attack for the year 1223/1808. Sulayman is even reported as having called for Jihad, naming Pasha al-Ghazi al-Shawi head of a coalition of tribal elements from the al-Widan and Wardiqa.

Unfortunately, though probably inevitably, Mawlay Sulayman was incapable of carrying on his lofty ideal; the idea indeed was a discordance, a kind of contradiction in terms, and his anxiety concerning French hegemonism translated itself into futile measures to restrict foreign trade. In 1217/1802 Mawlay Sulayman suspended the export of wool but then agreed to allow merchants to ship what wool they had on hand at the old tar if. The corn trade suspended after the epidemic was asked to be re­opened by the 'Abda and Dukkala people who needed the cash and were getting restless. Moreover the ban on poultry, eggs, and citrus was rarely applied, particu­larly in the Rif.

To be sure, Sulayman made a last ditch effort at attenuating the number of Christian traders in his realm, and did even encourage for a while Moroccan merchants to travel to Europe for the purpose of selling ('African goods' such as feathers, gum, leather) and purchasing mostly British manufactured goods to the amount of $2,000 mexicos each. Although debatable from the religious point of view, Sulayman justified it as a way to limit the Christian presence in the realm. Moroccan merchants were how­ever required to enter their name as well as the sum of money they were carrying in the customs register. More­over, all imported articles were to be declared. In the event of death the merchants’ fortune became automatically Makhzan property. Mawlay Sulayman expected also a per­centage of their imports, while those suspected of making 'unreasonably high profits' were enjoined to make forced contribution to the treasury.

Moroccan traders however were never successful in their transactions abroad because of the Makhzan's restrictions. In any case Mawlay Sulayman felt compelled to rever­se his decision, making it a crime to trade, speculate, deal, sell or buy in the "Land of Christ." Moroccan mer­chants were instead encouraged to trade in the Muslim East, Explains al-Zayyani: "Trade in the abode of war is a sin, particularly in these insecure times these (traders) do not know how to differentiate between what is legal and what is not… Trade in the abode of war is explicitly forbidden… to transact with heathenish money is also a sin…" Said al-Ziyyani,  

"al-tijara fi ard al-harb bar am, wa la siyyama fi" hldha al-zaman al-ladhf gallat fihi al-amana… wa la yumayyizun bayn al-halal wa al-haram, wa yatawajjahun li ard al-harb wa al-tijara fiha haram, wa yata'amalun mu'amalat al-kuf-far wa hiya haram, wa ya'tun bi amwal al-kuffar wa hiya haram…"

Sulayman's decision to disallow his coreligionists from trading in Europe was mostly the result of British interference. The latter took umbrage at Sulayman's maneu­ver and interpreted it as a provocation. "To me," remarked Matra, "it only appears as an oblique blow at the Christian traders in Mogador, whose commerce must diminish in proportion as that of the Moors increases," The British navy began then attacking Moroccan ships sailing for Europe.  

It is evident that in view of the intemperate Brit­ish response, Mawlay Sulayman had little choice but comply with their demand to restrict his subjects from sailing to Europe and engage themselves in commerce. Moreover, the Sultan decreed a simultaneous proscription on the sale of grain, followed in 1230/1814 by a prohibition on cattle export.  In 1231/1815 Mawlay Sulayman issued a similar decree proscribing the sale of live oxen to the European powers. The embargo was to be enforced by Makhzan officials ('Mills) in conjunction with the 'Ulama'. Many officials however along with some of the jurists, were themselves deeply involved in foreign trade, thus the sul­tan's prohibition did restrict their business undertaking.  

Nonetheless, despite the stringent measures destined mainly to restrict Moroccan merchants from involving them­selves in foreign trade, the British by 1224/1809 were doubling the importation of supplies from Morocco in view of the size of their garrisons in Gibraltar and Cadiz. Exceptions were regularly granted to the various powers, and between 1223/1808 and 1227/1812 Sulayman exported 8,500 head of cattle to Britain for the handsome sum of $221,000. Even France was able to obtain grain as late as 1234/1818.  Despite the plague of 1235-36/1819-20 which forced most European diplomats and traders to leave the realm, business remained in the hands of selected agents (proteges). The shipment of grain and oxen continued uninterrupted along with that of raw silk, hides, goat skins, ivory, ostrich feathers, gums, almond, bee wax, honey, and some gold dust.

'Isolated' Morocco then was rather a bread basket destined for the exhausted European armies battling at its doorstep. Economically, the realm's destiny never ceased to be tributary to that of Britain, France, or Spain. Overwhelming European threats provided apparent justification for Mawlay Sulayman to maintain his Empire's trading association with the West. As the Sultan set out to preserve the Makhzan's commercial prerogatives, he also resolved to arm himself to protect what was left of Mawlay Ismail’s political revolution of increased cen­tralization. In short, religious arguments used increas­ingly by Sulayman as a symbol of Makhzan religious in­transigence to curtail private and illegal trafficking which dwindled the treasury brought the same Makhzan in close alliance with the 'evil' it struggled to prevent.

Perhaps the most tragic aspect of Sulayman's dilem­ma is that he had to come to grips with his innate repul­sion of the Christians, in order to preserve what could not be protected by charisma alone. Indeed as we shall see in the latter part of his rule, the Sultan applied a new type of warfare against the dynasty's detractors. The 'Alawite's fate was sealed by perhaps the first modern warfare in the realm based on such innovations as bayonet and heavy artillery. When Sulayman's call for trade restrictions were blatantly violated and contravened by Jewish agents at the Court, the Moroccan bourgeoisie in alliance with the Marabouts began to challenge the Sultan on doctrinal grounds.

D. The Revolt of "Evil Forces"

Moroccan chroniclers everywhere portray rebellions and revolutions in dark terms, but rarely in terms as venomous as those ushering in this period of ferment and unrest. The short period of relative peace which followed the seven year Siba (1205/1790-1212/1797), was soon broken by repeated insurrections leading in­exorably to the infamous Nakba. The Sultan was forced in turn to launch numerous counterattacks in order to thwart the sedition.

Mawlay Sulayman launched an expedition against Meknes in 1212/1797; in 1214/1799 he fought the recal­citrant Ait Yammurj in 1215/1800 he undertook the Campaign of Sus. A year later, he faced the Tadla in­surrection, because of the scarcity of grain. In 1216/ 1801 he also battled the Ait Umalu, Ban Muiayr, Zammur Ait Idrisen and the Gerwan in the Dukkala and the Haouz. He headed in 1217/1802 a Mahalla in the Rif as well as around Fez against the Hayyana. A year later he led one against the Ait Idrisen. Most of these revolts were induced by inter-tribal rivalries, sedentaries vs. nomads. In 1222/1807 Sulayman launched another Mahalla on the coastal areas and unleashed the Ait Idrisen" against the Gerwan. Two years later, it was the turn of the Ait Umalu, Ibn Khayran, Sama'alla and Wardigha.

There is little doubt that the plague of 1213/ 1798-99 played a determining factor in the social and political dissolution of the realm. Subsequently it created a shift in traditional alliances bringing sometimes the decimated elite closer to seditious groups. Insecurity throughout the Empire became again the norm. Mawlay Sulayman's health proved to be detrimental to his prestige, for every time the news of his illness would propagate, rumors of his death would invariably follow, thus leading to more anarchy. In 1218/1803, believing that the Sultan had died at the hands of a Jewish doctor, the population began plundering the Mallah of Rabat. The doctor sought refuge at the Zawiya of Mawlay al-Tuhami al-Wazzani further exacerbating the angry mob incited by a certain 'Ali Qaddur. The Sultan was compelled to appear in public to dispel the rumor.

Mawlay Sulayman faced his first defeat at Azru in 1226/1811 at the hand of a strong confederation of Middle-Atlas Berbers (Ait Umalu, Gerwan, Zammur, and Ait Yusi). A year later he was again defeated in the Shawiya after his attempt to mediate between the Awlad Hariz and Awlad Ali. In 1228/1813, after learning that the people of the Rif, notably the Galiyya, were trading with the Christians despite Makhzan orders, and that their governor Sidi Mohammed al-Salawi al-Bukhari (Sulayman's minister) also participated in contraband activities, Sulayman dispatched a punitive expedition to discourage any trafficking. The Arab contingents of Sulayman, the Banu Malika and the Banu Sufyan are said to have left a "trail of carnage and plunder," but with no lasting result except perhaps for a desire to rebel.  

In 1230/1814, the Sultan headed an expedition against the Mazamiza and the Awlad Bu Rizq. He then battled the turbulent tribes of the triangle of unrest, that is the Haouz of Marrakech, Dukkala-Shayazma, where they had revolted against the governor, Wali Mohammed b. Abdessadiq. The tribes were in fact attempting to rid themselves of Makhzan control over Mazagan, Safi and Mogador. The following year, Sulayman entrusted his son Mawlay Ibrahim with the task of subduing southern tribes of the Sahara (Ait 'Ata and Banu Sabah) who had the haughtiness to seize Makhzan property. The punitive expedition however proved disastrous, and the Sultan had to send his Sahib al-Tabi' (seal caretaker) Shaykh Ahmed b. Mubarak al-Wasif (d. 1235/1819), at the head of a contingent of 'Abids along with some artillery pieces in order to disperse the nomads.

The successive uprisings were unquestionably engen­dered by two main factors. First, the Makhzan inability to reconstitute its plague-crippled army, thus enabling the Siba to revivify.  This in turn brought the Sultan to rely increasingly on his artillery. Secondly, the Makhzan's desperate attempts at controlling the south­western trading outlets through military means along with seemingly contradictory religious edicts. But there is perhaps a third reason, no less crucial if one is to explain the abrupt outburst of frantic rebel­lions. It is the sudden Maraboutic strain, seething and lashing into fury over Sulayman's antagonism and implacability. The Makhzan was now faced with a: predicament. The Sultan's Khutba and epistle scolding the pseudo-ascetics and Faqirs (Mutafaqqirat al-waqt) had goaded the brotherhoods into a truculent refluence. Despite his acknowledged canonical strictness and cog­nizance, Mawlay Sulayman was declared unfit and superannuated.

In an effort to attenuate the restive mood of the Siba, the Sultan issued a decree in which he appealed to the populace to obey their Imam, i.e., Mawlay Sulayman, as part of their obligatory duties (Yajib al-sabr alayhi wa al-sam' wa al-ta’a). "The state being ordained by God, man must be patient under tribu­lation, for sedition and lese majesty are more iniqui­tous than any other besetting sin (Fasad al-qiyam 'ala al-Sultan ashadd wa a'zam min irtikabahum al-ma'asi)."  Nonetheless, insurrections continued with accrued virulence, particularly by the Berbers of the Middle Atlas, and at their head the mighty Ait Umalu led by al-Hajj Mohammed b. al-Ghazi al-Zammuri (Wa kana idh dhak a'zam al-barbar kalima wa ri'asa). The Ait Umalu terrorized the outskirts of Meknes plundering its countryside. In 1234/1818 Mawlay Sulayman unleashed rival Berber groups (Zammur, Ait Idrisen, Ait Yusi, Ait Yanmiur, Gerwan, and Banu Mutayr) against the Ait Umalu, and led together with his son Mawlay Ibrahim, a Mahalla composed of Udayas and 'Ablds. But a defection in his ranks led to the Sultan's humiliating capture and to the tragic death of his son.

Although unharmed, the Sultan was nonetheless disarmed and kept for four days by the mutinous Ibn al-Ghazi. The news of Mawlay Sulayman's capture (he was found in his tent reading the Dala'il al-Khayrat) had an inauspicious effect on the remaining years of his reign. The Sultan seemed to have run into a slough of despondency interpreted by his subjects as a calamitous event and an absence of Baraka (Fa kanat tilka al-hazima wasila li al-fitna wa sababan li kuli al-balawi wa al-mihan qama fiha khawarij al-barbar).

Al-Faqih Sidi Mohammed ibn Ahmed Akansus blames the Sultan Mawlay Sulayman for not having negotiated with the rebels and exonerated their offenses ('Adam qubul al-sulh wa radd al-shafa'a hin talaba dhalik al-'aduww fi awwal al-amr). Indeed Sulayman's unyielding attitude seemed to have incensed many of his foes. However, he found himself in an inextricable position. For one thing, the second plague of 1234/1818 was once more decimating his army, thus emboldening the Siba. Furthermore, his desperate appeals to the British for the quick delivery of field guns went unheeded because of a delay in payments.

Profoundly humiliated, the Sultan went on a puni­tive rampage against some of the Berber tribes that had deserted him. The Berbers apparently saw in the Sultan's fury a racially motivated outburst, and in 1235/1819 rose again under the leadership of a covetous Fattan, Mohammed Abu Bakr Amhawish of the Ait Sidi Ali. We are told that they unleashed their acerbity on "anyone who spoke Arabic."

In the interim, the people of Fez (al-Hadra al-Idrisiyya), wielders of economic clout but embittered by the Sultan's economic monopoly, rose against their governor, Wali al-Hajj Mohammed al-Saffar. The insurrection of the Fasis was no doubt related to the new outbreak of plague and the subsequent shortages. The plague had prevented all commercial intercourse with the outside, and the money invested and handled by Jewish speculators was lost (Li anna daa'at lahum amwal 'azima inda ahl al-dhimma li ajal tijaratuhum). The economic strangulation of the Fasis, induced by the Makhzan as well as by natural cataclysm, were to propel them into political opposition.

Despite Mawlay Sulayman's personal appeals to the Fasis, the latter, in collusion with dissatisfied elements in the Sultan's army, assassinated the ex-vizir Mawlay Ahmed al-Fishtali as a warning. The event again was interpreted as an ill-omened juncture threatening the Sultan if not the Dynasty (Wa bi qatlihi tahaddama janiban 'al min mulk al-Sultan). Before heading for Fez, Mawlay Sulayman attempted to loosen the Berber harassment and virtual siege of Meknes. Hence, the Sultan used the good offices of the Nasir Shaykh Sidi Abdellah b. Hamza al-'Ayyashi. The mediation of the Marabout succeeded in lessening the tension. The Fasi rebellion prompted the Sultan to renew his plea for more fire, arms (2,000 muskets). The Sultan promised the British that he would pay them with the duties on cattle, but the latter refused to proceed with any shipment before being reimbursed on outstanding accounts. Mawlay Sulayman also called upon the British merchants residing in Mogador to contribute towards freighting their vessels to the service of the Makhzan, his own navy being "in a bad state of disrepair."

After leaving his son Mawlay al-Hassan as Khalifa in Meknes, the Sultan advanced toward Fez where he encountered stiff resistance. But his Arab Udaya cavalrymen served him well, and together they were able to storm the city. Mawlay al-Hassan b. Sulayman was left at the head of a detachment of Udaya, in charge of the treasury which is reported to have contained twelve million "hard dollars." Infuriated by the action of the Fasis, but blaming particularly the Berbers, Sulayman ordered the looting of every house and property belonging to Berbers (Wa amara bi nahb jami'a diyar al-barbar allati bi Fas).

Mawlay Sulayman had however attempted to negotiate with the insurgents, despite the fact that the Fasis had invited the rebel Amhawish along with two powerful Marabouts, Mawlay al-Arabi al-Darqawi and Sidi al-Hajj al-Arabi al-Wazzani. In a letter addressed to the Fasi nobility which was read publicly by his son Mawlay 'Ali b. Sulayman, the Sultan pleaded once again with them to respect his authority. Following the plunder of the city by the Udayas, Mawlana Sulayman pursued his way to Marrakech leaving behind a contingent of his loyal cavalrymen in charge of the Idrissid capital. No sooner had the Sultan departed than the Udayas began harassing the population and looting the Jewish quarter (Wa dakhalu mallah ahl al-dhimma fa nahabuh fi ramadan naharan wa zanu wa sharibu al-khamr). The Fasis, suspecting that the Udayas were acting under Makhzan orders, decided to plot a coup.

The Makhzan's seasonal army had always disrupted the economic tranquility of the bourgeoisie, thereby reducing their clout which often ran contrary to the Sultan's interest. Indeed the army would regularly prey on shop-keepers. The notables of Fez, including Ahmed al-Harithi, and Qaddur al-Maghribi along with representa­tives of the Andalusian community led by Shaykh Abderrahman b. Faris, voiced their complaints to the Qadi of the city, Shaykh al-'Abbas b. Ahmed b. al-Tawdi b. Suda.   A disagreement ensued between the Qadi, the Fasis and the Mufti of Fez, Mohammed b. Ibrahim al-Dukkali. The argumentation centered around the legality of a mutiny against the Sultan, and Shaykh al-'Abbas b. Suda refused to support the disgruntled Fasis. He was subsequently replaced with Qadi Mohammed b. Abderrahman al-Dila'i.

Sulayman sent another missive to the Fasis in which he expressed his dismay and disillusionment. The letter, which was again read by Mawlay Ali, was mis­interpreted as a decision on the part of the Sultan to abdicate (Fa qal al-Nas al-sultan khala'a nasfsahu 'ani al-mulk)... Pressed by an angry mob demanding the abdication of the Sultan because of his "Tawahhub" i.e. "heresy" in condemning Maraboutism. Mawlay Ali was com­pelled to burn his father's letter. Mufti Ibrahim al-Dukkali, and al-Talib b. Jallun along with the chief architect of the Berber uprising 'al-Dajjal' Abu Bakr Amhawish pressed for the election (Bay’a) of Mawlay Ibrahim b. al-Yazid who in 1236/1820 was proclaimed Sultan of Fez.

Mawlay Ibrahim b. al-Yazid had governed Tetuan for a while and then in 1206/1791 his father Mawlay al-Yazid b. Mohammed named him Khalifa at Marrakech. Mawlay Sulayman had attempted to exile him but with the help of the Fasis 'Ulama he was allowed to remain in Fez. In 1217/1802 he was im­plicated in the Rif rebellion and had since declared his opposition to Sulayman. The Fasis were hoping that Mawlay Ibrahim b. al-Yazid would either rally the Udayas and the 'Abids to their side or would perhaps convince them to abandon the Sultan's cause and leave the city. They consequently sent a deputation to the Udayas headed by the Darqawa Marabout Mawlay al-'Arabi al-Darqawi, a firm supporter of the putsh, along with a Berber chieftain, Ibn al-Ghazi al-Zammuri to try to convince the Udayas to join the revolt.

Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the Fasi rebellion was their unholy alliance with the Marabouts against the Makhzan. It was this cabala of puissant merchants allied to the Siba and supported by powerful and recusant brotherhoods, particularly the contumacious Darqawa, that ostracized Sulayman's rule to the point of collapse. Unlike the 'Abids, the Udayas however remained loyal to Sulayman and even sent several decapitated insurgents to Marrakech. The 'Abids on the other hand handed over the keys to the treasury of Meknes "containing nine to ten million Spanish dollars."

Having secured the support of the 'Abids of Fez and Meknes, the unholy alliance turned then to Larashe for assistance but was rebuffed. Similarly Tangier re­fused to join the coalition although one of its influ­ential Qadis, Ahmed al-Fallus showed some eagerness in uniting with the insurgents but was quickly ousted by the governor of the city, al-Arabi al-Said. Only Tetuan did agree to side with the new contender to the throne.    However when the city opened its gates in 1236/1820 to Ibrahim b. al-Yazid and his supporters, the latter went on "an orgy of drinking and fornication (Wa akafu hunak 'ala al-khumur wa al-fasad...).

In one of his last attempts to subdue Fez, Amhawish fall into the curse of Sidna Shaykh. The narrative is accounted by Sidi Bouazza al-Barbari al-Sharif who marched with the expedition of Amhawish with the intention to encounter a saint of Allah in Fez. The bastion of Sufism in the city was of course the Tijaniya order. So he seemed to find his way quickly to the residence of Sidna Shaykh. Said he, as quoted in the Bughya and Kashf al-Hijab,  

“I went to the doorstep of his house and asked permission to enter, which they gave me. When I entered into the courtyard, I found the Shaykh busy with dhikr as he walked back and forth…When he finished I stood up to greet him and paid all the due respect due to him… Then I asked his wird and he gave it to me… Before leaving, the Shaykh asked me on the condition and ambition of the Amhawish militia. When I informed him, he turned to their site and stretched out his hand and then blew (saying uff)… On the next morning  I went to the place I left the forces of Amhawish. I was told that they lost the battle as they stood aghast strangely and nobody knew the cause of that. I felt certain that they faced defeat the time Sidna Shaykh (may Allah be pleased with him) blew at them, and that Allah Almighty cast terror into their hearts by the determination (himma) of our Master (may Allah be pleased with him).

Understandably, the Fasi uprising had disastrous effect on Sulayman's will to resist. In a moving gesture of support al-Zayyani addressed a poem to the Sultan urging him not to despair and to persevere in his thankless task of upholding the Shari'a. In his desperate search for obliging support, the Sultan and his son al-Tayyib headed for Tangier and Tetuan with a contingent of Udayas and a small detachment of Abids. Mawlay al-Tayyib was able to capture 300 rebels which he executed, hanging their heads around the ram­parts of the city. In the interim the pretender Ibrahim had died and was hastily replaced by his brother Mawlay al-Said b. al-Yazid." Sulayman decided instead to head precipitously for Fez, leaving behind his eldest son Mawlay Ali as governor of "all the northern district."

The Sultan requested also the help of his Khalifa at Mogador, the future Sultan Mawlay Abderrahman b. Hicham (1276/1859). After a difficult siege in which the city of Fez was bombarded, Sulayman was compelled to pursue the Fasis to surrender. The Sultan obviously overburdened and enfeebled began contemplating abdication in favor of his nephew, Mawlay Abderrahman because of the latter’s impeccable credentials. He consequently wrote his much praised testament (Wasiyya) which he addressed to the "pillars" of the Dynasty, the Udayas and to the 'Ulama and notables of Fez.

In his testament Sulayman grievously describes his recurring illnesses, disillusionment with the en­demic instability of his Empire and the irksome opposi­tions he had encountered, all of which had contributed to his decision to remove himself from kingship.

I do not have an iota of resentment against any of God's creatures [explains the Sultan] whatever occurred was predetermined by God and known only to him... what happened to me was by no mean unusual but has befallen on others before me in a more stultifying and per­verse way... I urge all of you... to fear God and to follow the Prophet's Sunna... and that of the Rashidun califs... I commit you to the care of our nephew Mawlay Abderrahman b. Hicham and I pray to God that my decision will be similar to that of Sulayman b. Abdelmalik when he selected Omar b. Abdellaziz... I conjure you to obey him...

In one of his last attempts to subdue recalcitrant tribes (Hayayna around Taza), the Sultan fell into an ambush and news of his death spread. However, when the rumor, propagated mainly by the defiant Fasis, failed to generate a total revolt, the latter deemed it more prudent to dissolve the siege and ask both Sulayman and Mawlay Abderrahman for forgiveness. According to the anonymous author of al-Ibtisam, most Fasis were still supporting Mawlay Sulayman, but it was the Andalusians who had sided with the pretender. In 1237/1822 the insurgents, having been granted the Aman, opened the gates of the city holding copies of the Quran and conferred with the Sultan at the mausoleum of Mawlay Idriss along with Sidi al-Hajj al-'Arabi al-Wazzani.

Despite Qadi Abi al-Fadl Abbas b. Ahmed b. Suda's cautionary advice to the Sultan, Mawlay al-Said b. al-Yazid was granted immunity. Before his demise which occurred on the 13th of Rabi'I 1238/Nov. 29, 1822, Sulayman raided the Zawiya al-Sharardiyya headed by Shaykh al-Mahdi b. Mohammed al-'Abbas al-Sharardi, for gross violations of the Shari'a and impropriety in the conduct of devo­tional duties. But the Sultan's Mahalla was surrounded and Mawlay Sulayman was once again captured and detained for three days.  

Soon after, he witnessed the last uprising of his reign: that of the Dhawi Bilal in complicity with the Shayazma of Mogador and at their head 'Allal b. Mohammed al-Shayazmi. Concludes Faqih Sidi Mohammed ibn Ahmed Akansus:

"It was this last uprising that destroyed the Sultan's illusion, thus worsening his illness which was responsible for his death."

Sulayman's misfortunate Mahallas have become proverbial. The Sultan is often criticized for having been too compassionate on his adversaries and for failing to act in more fiendish and ruthless way. There was perhaps a disinclination or even an inability on his part to project a fierce image. He certainly had no appetite for and no joy in that combination of manipulation, deceit, and arm-wrestling at which Sidi Mohammed was so adept at using; much less the implaca­bility and truculence of a Mawlay Isma'il. Perhaps British Consul James S. Douglas best described Sulayman's forbearing character:

Muley Soliman is a mild humane character about sixty years of age with much of the gentleman in his address. They say that he is fitter for heaven than to govern their nation, which can only be done well with severity. He does not appear to me to profess sufficient energy to reestablish such an empire in peace and good government..." Remarked earlier James Matra, "It is by the passion of fear only that the [Moors] can be restrained..."

Indeed, at his death, Mawlana Sultan Sulayman was hailed as a saint whose demise would be greatly mourned.

Mawlay Sulayman’s record of accomplishments in the sphere of religious puritanism had been strong if not remarkable and he has left an imprint on the country's elite that witnessed its full manifestation at the turn of the century with the resurgence of Salafism. However, like many preacher-activists, Sulay­man fell victim to what could be described as an inveterate obsession with regeneration and a blind passion for religious punctiliousness that obviously aggrieved those around him. Although this is by no means a criticism it became a basic flaw in his laborious and often unwieldy efforts at indoctrinating the represen­tatives of religious populism.

Indeed toward the end it became somewhat difficult for the Sultan's subjects to grasp some of his notions, basic intent, and the spirit of what he proposed to do. Perhaps it would have helped had he been a shrewder moral tactician. But part of the problem stemmed ironically from his impeccable moral credentials which he thought were sufficient to rally his people to his views or at least inspire them to adopt some of his prospcriptive exhortations. Moreover his inability to impose his will solely by force debilitated the effec­tiveness of his rule.

The crippling failure of Sulayman's wars against religious infringements and sedition were partially induced then by his cherished and self-proclaimed status as the all-cognizant Imam. His repeated appeals for deference and obeisance to his rule can attest to it. His abdication in the end was the mark of a disconsolate and downtrodden man. Mawlay Sulayman has often failed to recognize the procedural impediments to his relations with the regional powers as well as the sophistry inherent in the Mushawara conventionality. Sulayman made also the mistake of not involving other peripheral figures with strong followings of their own (witness his rejection of al-Darqawi) in the common task of subduing the confine of his Empire or to give them a substantial stake in the success of his own policies.

Rather, Mawlay Sulayman relied on his own for­midable intelligence, religious prestige and quasi saintly behavior—and on a set of Fuqaha' who, despite their commitment to the defense of the Sunna did not always measure up to his integrity and who made little effort to actively support his mettlesome but mordant program. After all the 'Ulama had since the XVII century undertaken the task of traditionalizing the countryside in a "vertical solidarity" push in order to bridge the gap between official and popular Islam.

Too often Sulayman has been captured perhaps by his conceit that his mystique and communion with God could compensate for the daily drudgery of internal crisis, economic problems, foreign pressure, and natural disasters. When challenged by the Berbers, the Brother­hoods and the Fasis, he became lost in stupefaction and disgruntlement and stood aghast at their challenge. And therein lies the paradox, the Ghuluww or extremism his detractors have accused him of preaching was in fact initiated in a pacifistic and intellectualistic manner. Had Mawlay Sulayman launched an intemperate Jihad on the Almoravide scale and had he committed some of the excesses attributed to the Almohads he might have succeeded, although militarily only the Udayas proved to be reliable.

It is clear that Mawlay Sulayman's Salafi doctrine could not always be put into practice at the grass roots level. Even the cultural elite was disinclined to approve a program dreadfully violent and regarded by many as sectarian. Moreover, the Fuqaha' and other clerics simply rejected the notion that their religiosity and methods of teaching lacked scripturalist fervor, and preferred the traditional continuity of Maliki conservatism. The Sultan Sidi Mohammed ibn Abdellah's efforts at reducing the chasm between the four schools could not erase several cen­turies of unswerving fidelity to the spirit of Imam Malik.

So politically, the introduction of certain aspects of Salafism was unquestionably a tactical error insofar as it did not attempt to cover the move with the cloack of Maghribi formalism. If Almohadism irked the masses with its metaphysical abstractions and intellectualism, Salafism, although as dry in its strictness and austerity as Malikism, frightened everyone; it con­tradicted directly their deep-seated belief in the pre­eminence of the House of the Prophet (peace and blessing be upon him), the canonization of the ways of Malik, the importance of sainthood and other reverent aspects of the faith they had come to view as having been perfected since the advent of the Marinids.

Moroccans were perhaps more than any other Muslims acutely aware of the dangers of heresies; their politico-religious history until the consolidation of the Marinid Dynasty is a pertinacious battle against sectarianism. Only Malikism enabled the realm to gain its equilibrium. Therefore because of the country's pres­sure toward religious conformity, harsh Salafism was miscon­strued as a brutal and a seditious ideology with a "bla­tant disregard" for the institution of Sharifism, disre­spectful of that of the Califate, and with a Kharijite-like stance on devotional duties which ostensibly ran contrary to the incessant search for the medial solution (al-Hall al-Wasat).

The geo-political realities of the Empire were also partially responsible for Sulayman's difficulties and consequent inability to control its destiny. Morocco had become ever more dependent on extraneous forces and its agricultural potential became in effect a liability. The externally induced economic dependency became rooted on two dominant groups, in this case the Sultan and his entourage and the peripheral powers, which saw their economic well being as well as their security subordinate to a foreign nation. Indeed the invulnerability of the Dynasty rested on a continuous exchange of commercial concessions for more weapons: their procurement was crucial in order to offset any European-regional relations. Sulayman's persistent imprecations to the British showed the extent to which his fate and that of his Sultanate were very much manipulated by forces outside the realm. The southwest region of the Empire had been particularly unstable during Sulayman's rule. Once the Sultan had eliminated his powerful rivals (Ibn Nasir al-'Arusi) he attempted to seal off their land for Makhzan use. However the plague which had decimated the population enabled some mountainous tribes to invade the lower lands, thus reviving a new oppositional front at the Makhzan's doors.

The Sultan did attempt to reassert his supremacy not so much through the traditional ritual of intimida­tion destined to revive his Baraka, but through deadly encounters. The regional powers saw it in turn as a never-ending expansionist policy initiated by a Sultan no longer willing to share some of his power or tacitly recognize their peripheral authority. Mawlay Sulayman had tried to address the funda­mental problems facing his Empire and had made some headway on a good many fronts; even where unsuccessful, such as reducing foreign influence on Moroccan soil, he nevertheless managed to play off his European connection particularly with Britain to stave off a Napoleonic threat. Given the circumstances, no one could have done better. Taming the whirlwind of anarchy, doctrinal opposition, foreign pressure, and natural disasters was a titanic task.   

Sources:  El Nasser Rachid Abdallah (1983) in unpublished Ph.D Thesis, "Morocco from Kharijism to Wahhabism: the Quest for Religious Puris" and others.